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Abstract
According to an increasingly popular view among philosophers of science,
both causal and non-causal explanations can be accounted for by a single
theory: the counterfactual theory of explanation. A kind of non-causal ex-
planation that has gained much attention recently but that this theory seems
unable to account for are grounding explanations. Reutlinger (2017) has ar-
gued that, despite these appearances to the contrary, such explanations are
covered by his version of the counterfactual theory. His idea is supported
by recent work on grounding by Schaffer and Wilson who claim there to be
a tight connection between grounding and counterfactual dependence. The
present paper evaluates the prospects of the idea. We show that there is only a
weak sense in which grounding explanations convey information about coun-
terfactual dependencies, and that this fact cannot plausibly be taken to reveal
a distinctive feature that grounding explanations share with other kinds of
explanations.
1 Introduction
For a long while, the notion of explanation figured in metaphysical debates mainly
in connection with questions of theory choice, explanatory power being one di-
mension along which competing metaphysical theories can be compared. Since a
couple of years, however, metaphysicians have become interested in explanation
from a different, more direct perspective. In particular, the view that there are
certain distinctively metaphysical explanations has become increasingly popular.
Arguably the most prominent cases in point (though not the only ones) are expla-
nations based on grounding.1 Pertinent examples include explanations of logically
1 See, among others, Audi (2012); Rosen (2010); Schaffer (2016); Schnieder (2011). Two remarks:
(i) I write ‘based on grounding’ as I favour a view according to which grounding is not identical to
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complex truths in terms of their simpler constituents (e.g.: Socrates is Greek and
wise partially because he is wise), explanations of truths about determinables in
terms of truths about corresponding determinates (e.g.: The taxi is colored because
it is yellow), and explanations of truths about mental properties in terms of truths
about neurological properties (e.g.: Kim is in pain because Kim’s c-fibres are fir-
ing). While it is widely acknowledged that there are such explanations, there is
no consensus on how they relate to explanations that have mostly been at issue
in the pertinent debates in the philosophy of science, i.e. explanations based on
causal relations (e.g.: The species became extinct due to the prevalence of preda-
tors). In a recent paper (2017), Alexander Reutlinger has argued that both types
of explanations can be accounted for by the same theory of explanation – indeed,
by a theory that follows the highly popular counterfactual approach to explana-
tion. Reutlinger’s proposal is part of a growing trend in the philosophy of science,
where a number of authors have recently argued that James Woodward’s (2003)
counterfactual account of causal explanation can be modified to also account for
various kinds of non-causal explanations.2 The apparent success of these attempts
motivates a view according to which not only causal, but all explanations, work by
providing information about patterns of counterfactual dependence between enti-
ties mentioned in explanans and explanandum. What would make this view par-
ticularly attractive is that it promises an informative monist account of explanation
which pinpoints a non-trivial feature that is common to a wide variety of otherwise
different explanations, including grounding explanations.3
As attractive as the view appears to be, however, it is not viable as it stands.
As I will argue in this paper, grounding explanations do not work by conveying
information about patterns of counterfactual dependence. The reason for this is
simple: a large number of paradigmatic cases of grounding either do not give rise
to counterfactual dependence, or do so only in a rather weak sense which does not
plausibly highlight any theoretically interesting property of explanations.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §2, I will go over the motivation
to endorse counterfactual approaches to explanation in general and for grounding
explanations in particular. Subsequently, I will present a precise statement of Reut-
linger’s proposal for a monist counterfactual theory of explanation and show that
a kind of explanation, but rather supports or backs explanations; I thus favour separatism about
grounding in the sense of Raven (2015). Most of what I say, however, could be adapted to a
position where ‘x grounds y’ would express a sense of ‘x explains y’. (ii) Not every distinctively
metaphysical explanation need be grounding-based. Glazier (2017), for instance, argues that
there are metaphysical explanations based on essences that differ from grounding explanations.
2 See, among others, Baron et al. (2017); Baron (2019); Bokulich (2011); Rice (2015); Reutlinger
(2016); Povich (2018, 2019); Saatsi and Pexton (2013).
3 For arguments in favour of a monist theory of explanation see (Schaffer, 2016: 89f), (Schnieder,
2011), and (Nickel, 2010).
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it successfully accounts for some paradigmatic grounding explanations. In §§3
and 4, I will discuss problems. While the problems discussed in §3 pertain to the
specific version of the account developed by Reutlinger, the problems discussed
in §4 pertain to the general idea of counterfactual approaches to explanation that
aim to account for grounding-based explanations. In §5, I will conclude with some
brief observations about the consequences of my conclusions for monism about
explanation.
2 Counterfactual Approaches to Explanation and Reut-
linger’s Theory
2.1 Preliminaries
Before we begin, let me make a number of assumptions explicit that will be in
the background of what follows (mostly for the sake of definiteness). First, I will
assume that grounding is an asymmetric, transitive relation between facts, where
facts are construed as relatively fine grained and abundant. In particular, I as-
sume there to be disjunctive, existential, and negative facts, and I moreover assume
there to be different necessarily obtaining facts. Second, I take the relata of the
explanation-relation (i.e. the relation between explanans and explanandum) to be
true propositions or collections thereof, where propositions are taken to be rela-
tively fine-grained. In particular, I assume there to be different necessarily true
propositions. Third, I assume that whether or not the explanation relation obtains
is an entirely objective matter, in the same sense in which it is, for instance, an
objective matter whether or not Goldbach’s Conjecture is true. While this is a con-
troversial view, it is assumed by my opponents in this paper and I will grant it to
them for the sake of the argument. Finally, a remark on the central ingredient of
all counterfactual approaches to explanation: the notion of counterfactual depen-
dence. It is important to keep in mind that the term ‘counterfactual dependence’
is not used unequivocally by all adherents of counterfactual approaches to expla-
nation. Depending on how it is understood, different counterfactual approaches
to explanation will make different predictions in some cases.4 While Woodward
favours an interventionist account of counterfactuals (2003: Ch. 3), other authors
work with (variations of) possible-worlds approach(es), and yet others take the
general idea of the theory to be compatible with multiple different approaches to
counterfactual dependence. Reutlinger, whose theory we will focus on below, re-
jects interventionism as a general account of counterfactual dependence, since he
(with Woodward 2003: 221) considers it ill-suited to account for non-causal forms
4 See Briggs (2012) for an informative comparison of an interventionist and a similarity-based
semantics that points out differences with regards to truth-conditions and evaluability.
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of explanatory dependence.5 At the same time, Reutlinger takes the motivation
and the general idea of counterfactual approaches to explanation to be largely sep-
arable from particular views about counterfactuals and compatible with various
(non-interventionist) accounts (2018: 78; 2017: 244; 2016: 736). Throughout the
paper, I will follow Reutlinger in this assumption and not presuppose any particu-
lar account of counterfactuals. Where specific assumptions about counterfactuals
become relevant, I will signal it.
2.2 The Main Idea of the Theory
The existence of explanations based on grounding is widely acknowledged. How-
ever, it is not fully clear how such explanations relate to more familiar types of
explanations such as, for instance, causal explanations. Reutlinger (2017) has ar-
gued that they can be covered by an account that takes as its starting point a the-
ory which has dominated the debate on explanation in the last couple of decades,
namely James Woodward’s (2003) counterfactual theory of causal explanation. In
this section I will go over the main idea and motivation for this latter theory, and
then present Reutlinger’s take on it.
According to Woodward’s theory, explanations work at least partially because
they make patterns of counterfactual dependence explicit. In making such patterns
explicit, explanations provide answers to a certain type of question, so-called what-
if-things-had-been-different questions. As Woodward puts it:
an explanation ought to be such that it can be used to answer what I call
a what-if-things-had-been-different question: the explanation must en-
able us to see what sort of difference it would have made for the ex-
planandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different in
various possible ways. (Woodward, 2003: 6)
Given the widely accepted view that events counterfactually depend on their causes,
it is straightforward to see how this idea works in the case of causal explanations.
In the simplest case of an explanation of a given token event E, citing a cause C
of E answers the question what would have been different had C not occurred: E
would not have occurred either.6
Importantly, however, and as stressed by Woodward, many causal explanations
that occur in scientific contexts do not merely provide the relatively unspecific
5 See, e.g. Reutlinger 2016: 738. For Reutlinger’s own account of counterfactuals that he takes to
be a direct competitor to Woodward’s, see Reutlinger (2013: Ch. 8).
6 As cases of preemption and symmetric overdetermination show, this will not be true for all
choices of C and E. Again, different theories of counterfactuals will evaluate such problematic
cases differently, but I take it to be uncontroversial that any account of counterfactual dependence
should deliver the same predictions for simple causal dependencies.
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information that a certain event mentioned in the explanandum would not have
occurred had some event mentioned in the explanans not occurred. (Cf. Wood-
ward 2003: 215ff.) Oftentimes, such explanations also provide information about
how precisely things would have been different with the event mentioned in the ex-
planandum, had things been different with the event(s) mentioned in the explanans
in some specific way or other. For instance, if a given event E involves some mag-
nitude having a certain value, and an explanation of E’s occurrence cites some
initial conditions and a law, then one can typically use the law to show how pre-
cisely the value of the magnitude associated with E would have changed, had the
initial conditions been different. A bit more concretely, consider an explanation of
why a car drives at 80mph that cites the driver’s pushing the gas pedal with a spe-
cific force f , some information about the internal workings of the car, and certain
laws of mechanics. In such a case, the respective laws will provide information
about how the car’s speed would have been different had the driver pushed with
a specific, different force f ′. In that sense, the explanation does not merely pro-
vide information about what would have happened had the event mentioned in the
explanans not occurred, but also about what exactly would have happened had a
range of specific, alternative events occurred. As we will see below, counterfac-
tuals that relate specific alternatives to the explanans to specific alternatives to the
explanandum are important to account for grounding explanations in terms of a
counterfactual approach.
Thus far I have illustrated the general idea of counterfactual approaches to ex-
planation for the case of causal explanations. This is the case for which Woodward
originally developed his theory.7 However, a number of authors have recently ar-
gued that the basic framework can be extended so as to also be applicable to various
non-causal explanations.8 Why should it specifically apply to grounding explana-
tions? Some support for this idea comes from recent work on grounding. Both
Jonathan Schaffer (2016) and Alaistar Wilson (2018a,b) have proposed accounts of
grounding according to which there is a tight connection between grounding and
counterfactual dependence. (Not incidentally, both accounts are largely inspired
by Woodward’s counterfactual theory of causation.) Wilson has tried to make the
case that grounding should be understood as metaphysical, as opposed to nomolog-
7 Note that Woodward acknowledges other types of explanations besides causal ones. However,
he does not claim that they can all be treated in his version of the counterfactual theory. In that
sense, he is a pluralist about explanation: contrary to Reutlinger and other monists, he does not
think that all explanations exhibit patterns of counterfactual dependence. As mentioned above,
one reason for this is that he favours an interventionist account of counterfactuals and does not
think that this account is applicable to non-causal forms of explanatory dependence. In his (2003:
221) he even suggested that not being interpretable in terms of interventionist counterfactuals is
a characteristic feature of non-causal explanations.
8 See the references in footnote 2.
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ical, causation. Part of his case is the view that “both grounding and nomological
causation are closely associated with distinctive patterns of one-way counterfac-
tual dependence” (Wilson, 2018b: 25). And while Schaffer does not claim that
grounding is causation, he argues that grounding and causation share important
similarities, one of which is that both give rise to counterfactual dependence. He
suggests, for instance, a “working test of token grounding [...] in terms of counter-
factual covariation: wiggle the ground, and the grounded wiggles” (Schaffer, 2016:
74).
It is somewhat unclear whether Schaffer and Wilson want to claim that every
case of grounding gives rise to counterfactual dependence, or merely a large class
of paradigmatic cases. In any case, we shall see that by ‘counterfactual depen-
dence’ they presumably mean something weaker than what is ordinarily under-
stood by this term.9 But be that as it may, even if there are cases where grounding
does not give rise to counterfactual dependence (in any sense of the term), this is
not necessarily a problem for counterfactual approaches to explanation. For, such
approaches aim to provide accounts of explanation and not of grounding. And it
might simply be the case that not all cases of grounding underwrite explanations
but merely those in which the grounded fact counterfactually depends on the re-
spective grounds. (Indeed, that every case of causation gives rise to counterfactual
dependence is a highly contested claim, the truth of which the counterfactual ap-
proaches are not generally taken to be hostage to.) Counterfactual dependence
would thus figure as a criterion of explanatory relevance, filtering out explanatorily
relevant grounds from those that are irrelevant (cf. Tan 2019: 39f). Hence, merely
pointing to a specific case of grounding that does not give rise to counterfactual
dependence is generally insufficient to falsify the counterfactual theory.
So, at least if Schaffer and Wilson are right about grounding, it might seem
initially plausible to assume that Reutlinger’s counterfactual theory of explanation
is applicable also to grounding explanations. The following optimistic statement
by Reutlinger thus might appear warranted:
[I]t is only mildly speculative to assert that the [counterfactual the-
ory of explanation] generalizes to all grounding explanations, if the
9 Schaffer proposes his working test of token grounding by extrapolating from a similar test for
token causation (Schaffer, 2016: 74). With respect to causation, he admits that the test is only
applicable “in a restricted simple range of cases” (2016: 64). He also points to cases of ground-
ing, where the test does not work, but claims that “plausible extensions” will work (2016: 79).
Wilson also mentions some cases where grounding does not give rise to counterfactual depen-
dence as it is ordinarily understood, but suggests that there are weaker kinds of counterfactual
dependence that always come along with grounding (Wilson, 2018b: §5). I will come back to
these cases below in §4. On the question to what extent one may assume that there is a unified
notion of counterfactual dependence which adherents of the counterfactual theory may rely on,
see also footnote 19 below.
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explanatory grounding facts exist as a matter of metaphysical contin-
gency. (Reutlinger, 2017: 250)
Before we move on to discuss Reutlinger’s theory in detail, let me briefly comment
on the restriction he makes in the above passage. Reutlinger restricts the scope of
the his theory to cases where the grounds mentioned in a given explanans do not
obtain necessarily. He does this presumably to avoid trivialization. For, at least ac-
cording to the standard account of counterfactual dependence, any fact vacuously
depends counterfactually on any arbitrary necessarily obtaining fact (and this will
also be true for any of the weakened versions of counterfactual dependence we
shall consider below). On the standard account, g counterfactually depends on f
just in case g wouldn’t obtain were f not to obtain. But on the Lewis/Stalnaker
semantics for counterfactuals, this latter claim will be vacuously true whenever f
obtains necessarily.10 So, at least on the standard account of counterfactual depen-
dence, counterfactual approaches do not seem to be able to distinguish between
explanations and non-explanations whenever the explanans mentions a necessarily
obtaining fact. However, one may argue that this is not so much a problem for
these approaches, but rather for the standard account of counterfactual dependence
(cf. Tan 2019). Indeed, most adherents of counterfactual approaches to non-causal
explanation assume there to be non-vacuous relations of counterfactual dependence
between necessarily obtaining facts.11 And even though there is no stable theory of
such relations at this point, it seems fair to follow Reutlinger and set explanations
in terms of necessarily obtaining facts aside, which I will do for the remainder of
this paper.
However, even if one concentrates on cases where “the explanatory grounding
facts exist as a matter of metaphysical contingency” (ibid.), there remains a related
problem. Many plausible candidates for grounding explanations are explanations
of necessarily obtaining facts in terms of contingent ones. For instance, it is widely
assumed that grass’s being green or not green is grounded in, and explained by,
grass’s being green. But it seems that counterfactual approaches cannot tolerate
such explanations. For, no necessarily obtaining fact can depend counterfactually
on any contingently obtaining fact.12 As far as I know, neither Reutlinger nor any
other adherent of a counterfactual approach to non-causal explanation discusses
10 While this problem does not straightforwardly arise in an interventionist framework, there are
serious questions regarding the idea of intervening on necessarily obtaining circumstances. The
assumption that there are such interventions is indeed often deemed incoherent; see (Weslake,
forthcoming: §3.3) and cf. (Woodward, 2003: 112). In any case, as mentioned above, Reutlinger
rejects interventionist accounts of causation; Reutlinger (2016: 738).
11 See, e.g., Baron et al. (2017) and Povich (2019).
12 For, if g obtains necessarily, then it obtains in every world and so there is no fact f such that if f
weren’t to obtain, g wouldn’t obtain. Something similar also holds for any the weaker versions
of counterfactual dependence that we’ll consider below.
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this problem. That being said, there is a potential response to the problem that
adherents of counterfactual approaches might find congenial. One may argue that
contingent grounds of necessary facts are not explanatorily relevant. While neces-
sarily obtaining facts are grounded in contingently obtaining facts, the reply would
go, they are explained only by other necessarily obtaining facts such as logical or
metaphysical laws. The idea in the background here would be that contingent facts
do not have enough explanatory oomph to fully account for necessarily obtaining
ones.13 While the contingent fact that grass is green fully grounds the necessary fact
that grass is green or not green, to explain why grass is green or not green one has
to refer to some necessarily obtaining fact, e.g., the law that, for every fact, either
it or its negation obtains. In that case, of course, accounting for such explana-
tions within a counterfactual theory would again require some theory of non-trivial
counterfactual dependence among necessary facts. So, more work would have to
be done to spell out this idea in detail. For the sake of this paper, though, I will
grant also this point to adherents of the counterfactual approaches to non-causal
explanations and from now on concentrate on cases of grounding where all facts
involved obtain contingently.
2.3 Statement of Reutlinger’s Account
Thus far we have discussed the general idea of counterfactual approaches to expla-
nation, but no precise statement of any particular account. Indeed, most adherents
of the idea leave their accounts at a relatively informal level. Reutlinger is a wel-
come exception to this.14 In a number of papers, he has made his account precise
as follows. We let propositions G1, . . . , Gm be generalizations, S 1, . . . , S n proposi-
tions that state initial and auxiliary conditions, and E the explanandum. According
to Reutlinger’s counterfactual theory of explanation, G1, . . . , Gm, S 1, . . . , S n ex-
plain E if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied:15
1. Veridicality condition: G1, . . . , Gm, S 1, . . . , S n, and E are (ap-
proximately) true.
2. Implication condition: G1, . . . , Gm and S 1, . . . , S n logically en-
tail E or a [nonzero, SR] conditional probability P(E|S 1, . . . , S n)
– where the conditional probability need not be ‘high’ in contrast
to Hempel’s covering law account.
13 Intuitions of this kind seem to play a role in the discussions around Blackburn’s Dilemma;
cf. Cameron (2010).
14 As noted by Khalifa et al. (2018: §2).
15 I am slightly altering Reutlinger’s original formulation. He takes the explanation relation to
obtain between sentences, while I take it to obtain between propositions. I do this mainly to
simplify presentation.
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3. Dependency condition: G1, . . . , Gm support at least one coun-
terfactual of the form: had S 1, . . . , S n been different than they
actually are (in at least one way deemed possible in the light of
the generalizations), then E or the conditional probability of E
would have been different as well. (Reutlinger, 2017: 244)16
Three comments on this: First, for what follows, neither the Veridicality Condi-
tion, nor the provisions about conditional probability will play any role. Second,
Reutlinger does not impose any requirements on the generalizations G1, . . . , Gm
apart from them being non-accidentally true (Reutlinger, 2017: 244, fn 9). Third,
although Reutlinger claims that his account “largely follows” (2017: 244) the one
by Woodward (2003: 203), there is a crucial difference between both (over and
above the fact that Woodward’s account is restricted to causal explanations). While
Woodward’s account is formulated in the framework of structural equation models
and against the background of an interventionist construal of counterfactuals, Reut-
linger wants to commit to neither of these. And indeed, whether non-causal expla-
nations are susceptible to being modelled by this machinery is controversial.17 So,
in line with Reutlinger, I will neither assume an interventionist construal of coun-
terfactuals nor the structural equations framework.18 For most of what follows, we
can rely on our philosophically informed, but otherwise pre-theoretical understand-
ing of counterfactuals (though I will occasionally put claims about counterfactual
dependence in terms of possible worlds, since it is heuristically useful).19
16 Cf. also Reutlinger (2016) and Reutlinger (2018).
17 For skepticism concerning the notion of intervention in cases of non-causal explanations, see
Khalifa et al. (2018) and Saatsi and Pexton (2013). For problems with structural equation models
in non-causal contexts, see Jansson (2018) and Koslicki (2016).
18 Two referees have raised the question whether Reutlinger’s non-interventionist counterfactual
theory of explanation is still in the spirit of Woodward’s original account. After all, since both
authors endorse different views on the semantics of counterfactuals, their theories might lead to
different predictions even in the realm of causal explanations. Since my criticism below will be
mainly concerned with Reutlinger’s theory and not with Woodward’s, this question is tangential
to the main argument of the present paper. That being said, I’d like to stress that Woodward and
Reutlinger endorse two core ideas that underlie each of their accounts of explanation, namely
the idea that (a) explanations make explicit how specific ways for the explanans to be different
relate to specific ways for the explanandum to be different (they answer what-if-things-had-been-
different-questions), and that (b) such relations between ways to be different can be expressed in
terms of counterfactuals. Indeed, Reutlinger himself takes the core idea of Woodward’s account
to be independent of the latter’s specific theory of counterfactuals. See (Reutlinger, 2018: 78),
(Reutlinger, 2016: 735-6). Notably, Woodward has defended (a) and (b) in earlier works inde-
pendently of an interventionist account of counterfactuals; cf. (Woodward, 1979: 54-5). Also
in later works he takes (a) to be an idea that holds both for causal and non-causal explanations
(2003: 221), despite the fact that he takes his interventionist theory of counterfactuals only to be
properly applicable to causal explanations.
19 I should stress that this is a non-trivial assumption – though one that is in favour of my opponents
in this paper. For it is unclear whether there is a robust pre-theoretical notion of counterfactual
dependence that is applicable to causal and non-causal cases alike. In addition to that and as
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With this out of the way, let us move on to see how the theory accounts for a
number of paradigmatic examples for grounding explanations.
2.4 Success Cases
As is commonly assumed, given that {Mars} exists, the fact that {Mars} exists is
fully grounded by the fact that Mars exists. It is also commonly assumed that such
cases of grounding underwrite grounding explanations: {Mars} exists because Mars
exists. This seems perfectly in line with Reutlinger’s theory. We can safely assume
the Veridicality Condition to be satisfied. The Implication Condition should be
satisfied as well. That Mars’s existence comes along with {Mars}’s existence is no
accident. The existence of any given object necessitates the existence of its sin-
gleton. So, there is a non-accidental generalization which, in conjunction with the
truth that Mars exists, logically entails the truth that {Mars} exists. Finally, also
the Dependency Condition is satisfied: if Mars wouldn’t exist, {Mars} wouldn’t ex-
ist either. Plausibly enough, this counterfactual is supported by the generalization
involved in our explanation.20
There are further success cases. The fact that snow is white and the fact that
grass is green jointly ground the conjunctive fact that snow is white and grass is
green. And there is a corresponding grounding explanation of the conjunctive fact
in terms of its conjuncts. Also this case is covered by Reutlinger’s account. We can,
again, safely assume the Veridicality Condition to be satisfied. The Implication
Condition is satisfied as well. Conjunctive facts are necessitated by their conjuncts,
taken jointly. And so there is a non-accidental generalization that, together with
the truth that snow is white and the truth that grass is green, logically entails the
truth that snow is white and grass is green. Finally, the Dependency Condition is
satisfied: if snow were not white or grass were not green, it would not be the case
mentioned earlier, different semantic paradigms for counterfactuals evaluate them in different
ways, leading to different assignments in truth-value, different inferential behaviour, and even to
differences with respect to the question whether certain counterfactuals are evaluable in the first
place. (See, again, Briggs (2012) for a recent discussion of differences between interventionist
and similarity-based accounts.) And even if we grant Reutlinger that his theory is compatible
with a variety of different counterfactual dependence accounts of causation (Reutlinger, 2017:
251), it is unclear whether any of these accounts can be extended to also cover non-causal forms
of counterfactual dependence.
20 Since Reutlinger does not specify what exactly he means by ‘counterfactual support’, this last
point is not as straightforward as it may seem. Reutlinger merely mentions a necessary condi-
tion for a generalization to support a particular counterfactual, namely that the generalization
be non-accidentally true (Reutlinger, 2017: 244, fn 9). This condition is satisfied in the case at
hand. Moreover, since the counterfactual in the present case is a necessary truth, it is vacuously
entailed by whatever generalization appears the explanans. But one might conceivably construe
the relation of counterfactual support to be something more demanding than mere entailment.
Here and in what follows, however, I will grant Reutlinger that the requirement of counterfactual
support is satisfied.
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that snow is white and grass is green.21 Plausibly enough, this counterfactual is
supported by the generalization involved in our explanation.
3 Problem-Cases I: The Implication Condition
The success cases show that Reutlinger’s version of the counterfactual theory yields
the right results at least sometimes. However, brief reflection on the cases also
shows that the account has some implausible consequences on the assumption that
the conditions it specifies are jointly sufficient for the explanation relation to obtain.
Two problems can be brought out by reflecting on the Implication Condition.22
These problems might not reveal fundamental flaws of the counterfactual theory
of explanation in general, but they point to some crucial problems of Reutlinger’s
specific articulation of it. And since it is at least not obvious how to reformulate
the account in such a way that it avoids the problems, it is worth taking a closer
look at them.
A circularity worry. Earlier (section 2.4), I have claimed that there is a non-
accidental generalization which, in conjunction with the truth that Mars exists,
logically entails the truth that {Mars} exists – as is required by the Implication
Condition. A plausible way to put this generalization is as follows:
(Singleton-Generalization) For any x, if x exists, {x} exists.
The problem is that non-accidental generalizations like this come very cheap. Next
to (Singleton-Generalization), there is also:
(Reverse-Singleton-Generalization) For any x, if {x} exists, x exists.
Together with the truth that {Mars} exists, this claim logically entails the truth that
Mars exists. And since Mars’s existence counterfactually depends on {Mars}’s exis-
tence, there seems to be an explanation of the former in terms of the latter according
to Reutlinger’s theory. Now, this will surely not be a grounding explanation since
grounding is asymmetric. Still, it satisfies all conditions of Reutlinger’s account
and thus counts as an explanation. But this means that Reutlinger’s conditions al-
low for explanatory circles. The truth that Mars exists helps explain a truth that
21 The example that Reutlinger discusses in his paper (2017: §4) is fundamentally of the same sort.
He discusses explanations of why a given truth is a Humean law in terms of the collection of
instances of the law (the Humean mosaic), and the conditions for being a law according to the
Best System Account. As he presents the case, this explanation relies (at least in part) on the
fact that universal generalizations are grounded in their instances. This idea, in turn, is usually
viewed as a generalization of the idea that conjunctive facts are grounded in their conjuncts; see,
e.g., (Fine, 2012: 59).
22 Further problems for the sufficiency of the account are pointed out by Khalifa et al. (2018).
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helps explain the truth that Mars exists (and similarly for any other explanation of
this singleton-member type). I take this to be a highly undesirable result. Even if
one is generally open to the existence of some explanatory circles (as Reutlinger is:
2017: 253), such circles should not be that prevalent and that easy to establish.23
It is conceivable that this problem can be circumvented by imposing additional
conditions on the generalizations admissible in explanations or by working with
a more demanding conception of counterfactual dependence.24 To develop such
a conception, however, is a burden adherents of the counterfactual theory have to
carry.
An overgeneration worry. Even if we bracket the aforementioned circularity-
problem, Reutlinger’s conditions are implausibly permissive. To see this, sup-
pose that some initial conditions I and a generalization G pass Reutlinger’s con-
ditions for some given explanandum E. If this is the case, then I, G, and the
non-accidentally true generalization that everything is self-identical will also pass
the conditions. Since logical consequence is non-monotonic, adding the truth that
everything is self-identical to a given explanans will not lead to a failure of the Im-
plication Condition. Nor will it lead to a failure of the Dependency Condition. For,
it will surely not prevent the generalization in the explanans from supporting the
counterfactual pertinent to the explanation in question. Hence, I, G, and the truth
that everything is self-identical will count as an explanation for E. But clearly,
the truth that everything is self-identical is not in general explanatorily relevant to
every truth that has an explanation at all.
In order to prevent cases like this, one could slightly modify the Implication
Condition such that each part of the explanans ought to be necessary for the ex-
planandum to be logically deducible from it.25 However, if this is how the account
is to be understood, a problem emerges. This problem can be brought out by re-
flecting on the second example mentioned above: the explanation of a conjunction
in terms of its conjuncts. In this case, no generalization is necessary to ensure the
truth that grass is green and snow is white to be logically deducible from the truth
that grass is green and the truth that snow is white. But this means that if we under-
stand Reutlinger’s conditions in such a way that they exclude deductively redun-
dant generalizations from being part of the explanans, the explanation at hand does
not satisfy the conditions after all. And similar remarks apply to any explanation
that is based on what is often called logical grounding, i.e. grounding explanations
23 Note that Reutlinger seems to assume that metaphysical explanations are generally asymmetric
(Reutlinger, 2017: 253).
24 Indeed, A. Wilson takes it that an interventionist construal of counterfactual dependence can
circumvent this type of problem; see (Wilson, 2018a: §§4,5). His corresponding remarks remain,
however, programmatic.
25 Cf. (Reutlinger, 2018: 79).
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of logically complex truths in terms of their simpler constituents. For, in any such
case, the respective groundee is logically entailed by its ground.26
So, it seems that Reutlinger’s version of the counterfactual theory of expla-
nation either countenances far too many explanations to be acceptable (due to the
Implication Condition being too liberal), or it entails that no case of logical ground-
ing underwrites an explanation (due to a failure of a suitably restricted version of
the Implication Condition). Again, it seems conceivable that suitable reformula-
tions of the account could prevent this problem, but it is not obvious how such
reformulations might look like, and the burden of spelling out the details lies with
adherents of the counterfactual theory.
4 Problem Cases II: The Dependency Condition
While I do think the problems mentioned in the previous section cast serious doubt
on the viability of Reutlinger’s specific formulation of the counterfactual theory of
explanation, I do not think this is a fatal blow for his project, or for the counterfac-
tual theory in general. After all, there have been very few successful attempts to
characterize philosophically central phenomena in terms of explicitly stated neces-
sary and sufficient conditions. Why should explanation be different in this respect?
It would be interesting enough if the counterfactual theory, in Reutlinger’s ver-
sion, merely specified conditions that are necessary for the explanation-relation to
obtain and which point to a non-trivial feature that grounding explanations share
with other types of explanations. There are, however, several other cases in which
the crucial condition of the counterfactual theory – the Dependency Condition –
does not seem to be satisfied. I will consider two kinds of cases. The first kind
are grounding explanations of the instantiation of properties that can be realized in
multiple, mutually incompatible ways. The paradigm case of this are explanations
of why some object has a determinable property that cite a corresponding more
determinate property. Structurally related cases are (at least on some accounts)
explanations of mental facts in terms of physical facts and explanations of disposi-
tions in terms of their categorical bases. A second kind of case are explanations of
facts that are overdetermined by their grounds. Paradigmatic examples are expla-
nations of disjunctive facts in terms of their disjuncts, where more than one disjunct
obtains, or explanations of why there are certain Fs that cite one among many par-
ticular Fs. In neither of these cases can we expect the fact cited in the explanandum
to counterfactually depend on the facts cited in the explanans in any ordinary sense
of ‘counterfactual dependence’. In §§4.1 and 4.2, we shall see that there is a way to
understand Reutlinger’s Dependency Condition on which it is nonetheless satisfied
26 See e.g. (Correia and Schnieder, 2012: 21).
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in those cases. In §4.3, however, I shall argue that understanding the condition this
way comes at the cost of trivializing it.
4.1 Determination
Facts involving determinable properties are generally assumed to be grounded in
facts that involve corresponding, more determinate properties. For instance:
(1) The fact that rose r is scarlet grounds the fact that r is red.
Does (1) underwrite a grounding explanation according to the counterfactual the-
ory? The Implication Condition is clearly satisfied. Facts involving determinates
of a given determinable property necessitate facts involving the latter. So, there is
a non-accidental generalization that, in conjunction with the truth that r is scarlet
(and truths to the effect that being scarlet is a determinable of being red), logically
entails the truth that r is red. What about the Dependency Condition? At first
glance, it might seem that a case like (1) poses serious trouble for the condition.
For, it is doubtful that the following counterfactual is true:
(2) Had r not been scarlet, r would not have been red.
Indeed, on the Lewis/Stalnaker semantics, (2) seems false. The closest worlds in
which r is not scarlet will surely encompass worlds in which it has some other
shade of red.
Note, however, that (2)’s not being true does not show that Reutlinger’s Depen-
dency Condition is not satisfied. For, the condition does not require the truth of a
counterfactual of the form ‘had S 1, . . . , S n not been the case, E wouldn’t have been
the case’. It merely requires that the generalizations of the explanation “support at
least one counterfactual of the form: had S 1, . . . , S n been different than they actu-
ally are (in at least one way deemed possible in the light of the generalizations),
then E [...] would have been different as well” (Reutlinger, 2017: 244).27 In other
words, the counterfactual theory merely requires that some counterfactual of a cer-
tain type be true: a counterfactual whose antecedent mentions some specific way
for the initial conditions to be different. And there are such counterfactuals in the
case at hand, for instance:
(3) If rose r were beige, it would not be red.
(4) If rose r were navy, it would not be red.
27 Cf. also (Reutlinger, 2018: 79). I do not assume that Reutlinger requires the counterfactuals in
question to have precisely the form he indicates in the above quote, i.e. such that the antecedent
existentially quantifies over ways of being different. In any case, the counterfactuals I’ll consider
below entail counterfactuals of precisely the form indicated above.
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(5) If rose r were navy, it would be blue.
So, at least on an intuitive level, there seem to be ways for the initial conditions
of our grounding explanation to be different on which the explanandum is differ-
ent as well. Further, it seems plausible that counterfactuals (3)-(5) are supported
by the generalizations involved in the explanans.28 In that case, the Dependency
Condition is fulfilled, and the explanation satisfies all of Reutlinger’s conditions.
The same should hold for nearly all cases of grounding that involve determinate-
determinable links.29 And if the conditions are fulfilled in cases of grounding that
involve determinate-determinable links, they should also hold for analogous cases
mentioned earlier, i.e. (on some views) explanations of dispositions in terms of
their categorial bases, explanations of facts about mental states in terms of facts
about physical states.
So, it seems that cases of grounding that involve determinable properties (or
other multiply realizable properties) do not pose a problem for Reutlinger’s condi-
tions. Let us next see how the conditions cope with other cases of grounding that
do not give rise to ordinary counterfactual dependence.
4.2 Overdetermination
Many facts are overdetermined by their grounds. Typical cases in point are existen-
tially quantified facts that have multiple obtaining instances. Before we consider
whether the CTE can deal with such cases, we need to get a clearer grip on the
kinds of counterfactuals that are pertinent to the Dependency Condition. In the
case of determinates and determinables, the condition was arguably satisfied. The
counterfactuals witnessing this in our example case ((3)-(5)) are in a certain sense
more specific than counterfactuals witnessing ordinary counterfactual dependence.
Their evaluation requires us to consider relatively specific ways for the initial con-
ditions of a given explanation not to obtain rather than them simply not obtaining.
However, while it was relatively clear in the case above what such specific ways
for conditions not to obtain amount to, it is not clear in general.
In Woodward’s counterfactual theory of causal explanation, ways for initial
conditions of an explanation not to obtain correspond to results of idealized in-
terventions that change values of variables in a structural equation framework.30
However, as mentioned earlier, Reutlinger does not want to make any commitment
to this part of Woodward’s account (and for good reasons, see footnote 17 above).
28 Again, if one were to take entailment to be sufficient for counterfactual support, (3)-(5) would
clearly be supported by the generalizations in our explanans, since (3)-(5) are all necessarily true.
29 Possible exceptions concern determinables that occur in necessarily obtaining facts, which I
exclude from consideration; cf. section 2.2 above.
30 See (Woodward, 2003: Ch. 2).
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But what else shall we, in general, understand by a way for conditions to be dif-
ferent? For present purposes, I propose to take ways to be different to correspond
to possible worlds. To consider some condition C to be different in some specific
way C′ means to consider a world where C′ does, and C does not, obtain.31
With this in the background, let us consider how the counterfactual theory
copes with explanations of overdetermined facts. Consider the fact that there
are musicians. According to virtually every account of grounding, this fact is
grounded, for instance, in the fact that Clapton is a musician:
(6) That Clapton is a musician grounds that there are musicians.
It is, again, widely assumed that such grounding facts give rise to grounding expla-
nations.32 Clearly, however, the following counterfactual is false:
(7) If Clapton weren’t a musician, there would be no musicians.
In other words, the fact that there are musicians does not counterfactually depend
on Clapton’s being one in the ordinary sense of the term. The former fact is overde-
termined by its grounds, and radically so. Still, there is some way for our explanans
to be different that will lead to the explanandum being different. For, given our
previous proposal to understand ways for conditions to be different, any world in
which there are no musicians corresponds to a way for the condition of Clapton’s
being a musician to be different on which the fact that there are musicians does
not obtain. And while the worlds closest to ours are worlds in which there are
musicians, there are also worlds, and hence ways for the initial conditions of the
explanation in question to be different, in which there are none.33 In particular, if
we let C be a condition that is satisfied precisely in the worlds in which there are
no musicians, the following counterfactual comes out true:34
31 As a general characterization of ways to be different, the proposal is presumably too coarse
grained in some respects, and too fine grained in others. It is too fine grained in that it distin-
guishes between different ways for, say, the condition of Socrates being wise to be different that
differ merely in minor details having nothing to do with Socrates or his wisdom (e.g. the precise
temperature on Alpha Centauri tomorrow noon). It might be too narrow in that it cannot distin-
guish between different ways for conditions not to obtain whenever those conditions necessarily
do not obtain. These points do not matter for the cases at hand, however.
32 Incidentally, that existential quantifications are explained by their instances is a thesis that Lewis
(1986: 223) defended, quite independently from any considerations about grounding. Of course,
adherents of the view that existentially quantified facts (such as the fact that there are musicians)
are explained by their instances are by no means committed to the view that there aren’t also
other explanations of such facts (e.g. an anthropological or socio-cultural explanation of why
there are musicians).
33 On an interventionist interpretations of counterfactuals, such cases are not easily dealt with.
There does seem to be a coherent conception of intervention on which one can intervene on
Clapton’s being a musician in such a way that there are no musicians.
34 This way to cope with ground-theoretic overdetermination is to a certain extent similar to the
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(8) If Clapton weren’t a musician and C obtained, there would be no musicians.
Are such counterfactuals supported by the generalizations employed in the rele-
vant explanations, as required by Reutlinger’s Implication Condition? Plausibly,
the generalizations that are involved in grounding explanations of existential quan-
tifications will track the truth-conditions of the latter (cf. Fine 2010: 105f). And
such generalizations do seem to support counterfactuals like (8).
It deserves to be mentioned at this point that even though the explanation we
have considered is somewhat of a toy-example, it instantiates a structure that is
found also in more interesting cases. Plausibly, that someone is a criminal is
grounded in, and can be explained by, them committing some given crime. Suppose
Robin has committed many crimes: he robbed a bank, committed tax-fraud, etc.
Each of these crimes, individually, suffices to metaphysically explain why Robin is
a criminal. On the present understanding of ways to be different, the counterfactual
theory confirms this. While Robin would still be a criminal if he hadn’t committed
any particular of his crimes taken individually, there is a true counterfactual of the
following form:
(9) If Robin hadn’t robbed the bank and D obtained, Robin wouldn’t be a criminal.
where D is a condition that holds in precisely those worlds in which Robin did not
commit any crimes.
4.3 Trivialization
We have seen that the conditions of Reutlinger’s counterfactual theory of explana-
tion are satisfied in a wide range of grounding explanations, even in cases where
the respective explananda do not counterfactually depend on the explanantia in
the ordinary sense of the term. The theory achieves this by focussing on more
specific counterfactuals: counterfactuals that encode specific ways for conditions
mentioned in the explanans to be different which come along with specific ways
for conditions mentioned in the explanandum to be different. And while Reutlinger
does not give any explication of what such ways to be different are supposed to be,
we have found one straightforward construal of this notion that is wide enough to
way to cope with symmetric, causal overdetermination in structural equation frameworks by rel-
ativizing counterfactual dependence to values of variables in a “redundancy range”; cf. Hitchcock
(2001: 289-90) and Woodward (2003: 83-4). Abstracting from details of the structural-equation
framework, the basic idea of this approach is as follows. An event E that is causally overdeter-
mined by the events C1, . . . , Cn can be said to counterfactually depend on each Ci (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n)
in the sense that under the condition that the causal ties between E and each of the other events
C j (with 1 ≤ j ≤ n and i , j) are severed and Ci wouldn’t occur, E wouldn’t occur. Condi-
tions like the one expressed by the antecedent of such a counterfactual correspond to ways for
Ci’s occurrence to be different in the sense specified above – they are specific ways for Ci not to
occur.
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account for many standard examples for grounding explanations. However, while
this saves Reutlinger’s account from obvious counterexamples, it also puts the idea
that the account identifies a unifying feature of different kinds of explanations in
jeopardy.
First, that grounding explanations track counterfactual dependencies in the
sense that they entail claims such as (8) or (9) is not a particularly informative
feature. After all: for any two contingent facts f and g, there is a counterfactual of
the form ‘if f would not obtain and C obtained, then g would not obtain’. Simply
pick any condition incompatible with g for C. Since g is contingent, we are guaran-
teed that there will be such a condition. But a notion of counterfactual dependence
that obtains between any two contingent facts can surely not be said to pick out a
feature that informatively distinguishes explanatory relations from any other kind
of relation between contingent facts. At best, it seems, a counterfactual such as
(10) If neither Clapton nor anyone else were a musician, there would be no musi-
cians.
is a cumbersome way to express that a given existentially quantified fact would
not obtain if none of its instances obtained. But this kind of information is al-
ready carried by the generalizations (the metaphysical laws) which are involved in
a grounding explanation of why there are musicians. A counterfactual like (10)
does not seem to add any explanatorily relevant information to these generaliza-
tions. Consequently, it is at the very least unclear whether the Dependency Condi-
tion identifies a non-trivial feature which grounding explanations share with, e.g.,
causal explanations. Even though this does not strictly speaking render the theory
false, it considerably weakens Reutlinger’s case for explanatory monism.
Second, and related to the first point, if grounding explanations merely give rise
to a kind of counterfactual dependence that is encoded by claims such as (8) and
(9), it becomes unclear how the counterfactual account can distinguish between ex-
planatorily relevant and explanatorily irrelevant information. At the beginning of
the paper, I have mentioned that in the realm of causal explanations counterfactual
dependence is often offered as a criterion that distinguishes explanatorily relevant
causal influences from those that are irrelevant.35 As some have argued, such dis-
tinctions can also be made with respect to grounding explanations; that is, one
can sensibly distinguish between grounds that are explanatorily relevant to a given
grounded fact and those that aren’t.36 It is a desideratum for a theory of grounding
explanations to account for this distinction. However, to the extent that the coun-
terfactual theory has to invoke the weak notion of counterfactual dependence that
we have discussed above, it is unable to do this.
35 See (Tan, 2019: 39) and (Hitchcock, 1995: 311).
36 See (Kra¨mer and Roski, 2017: §5).
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An obvious rejoinder to the problems mentioned above would be to argue that
the construal of Reutlinger’s Dependency Condition that I have proposed is sim-
ply too weak and should be replaced by a stronger construal. Taking a cue from
Lewis’s late theory of causation as influence (Lewis 2000: 190), a natural sugges-
tion would be not to allow the Dependency Condition to be satisfied on any way
for the initial conditions to be different, but only on ‘not too distant’ alterations
to them. Accordingly, adherents of the counterfactual theory could replace the
Dependency Condition by the following one:
Narrow Dependency Condition: The generalizations involved in our expla-
nation support at least one counterfactual of the form: had the initial condi-
tions of the explanans S 1, . . . , S n been different than they actually are (in at
least one way deemed possible in the light of the generalizations) and within
a range of not too distant alternations to S 1, . . . , S n, then E would have been
different as well.
This way, the theory would still capture the idea that explanations answer what-if-
things-had-been-different-questions by providing counterfactual information about
conditions for the explanandum to be different on which the explanans is different
as well. However, the kind of counterfactual dependence required by the Narrow
Dependency Condition is non-trivial: it clearly does not obtain between any two
contingent facts.
Unfortunately, though, on this understanding of the counterfactual theory, it
can no longer account for many grounding explanations. Depending on how ex-
actly one wants to spell out ‘not too distant’, the condition may well be satisfied in
the determinate-determinable case. Plausibly, considering a world where an object
is navy blue rather than light red is a not too distant alteration of the initial condi-
tions. However, in the case of overdetermined facts such as the fact of there being
musicians, or of someone being a criminal, etc. the conditions are not generally
satisfied: a world with no musicians is surely too distant an alternative if anything
is. But these latter cases are paradigmatic examples for grounding explanations.
It is conceivable that the Narrow Dependency Condition can be weakened in
such a way that it accounts for all grounding explanations while not being trivially
satisfied. However, it is far from straightforward to see how this could be done. In
any case, the burden of proof lies with adherents of counterfactual approaches to
explanation.
5 Conclusion: Consequences for Explanatory Monism
Reutlinger proposes his counterfactual theory as a monist theory of explanation,
a theory that identifies features that are shared by causal, grounding, and other
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explanations. He argues that one such feature is a certain kind of counterfactual
dependence that holds between entities mentioned in explanans and explanandum.
However, on the most straightforward reading of his Dependency Condition, the
kind of counterfactual dependence that his theory requires to hold holds between
any two contingent facts. And on straightforward ways of strengthening the con-
dition, it is violated by paradigmatic grounding explanations. Either way, the con-
dition is unhelpful in identifying a feature that grounding explanations share with
other kinds of explanations. Note also that, while I have focussed on Reutlinger’s
specific account, the problems I have mentioned pose challenges for any account
that tries to cash out explanatory power in terms of counterfactual dependence. Re-
call, moreover, that we have already made substantial concessions to adherents of
the counterfactual theory. Even bracketing the aforementioned problems, a full-
blown monist version of the counterfactual theory should be able to account for
explanations that involve necessarily obtaining facts, and thus requires an account
of non-trivially true counterpossibles, which is thus far still a desideratum.
The prospects of a monist counterfactual theory of explanation do thus not
look bright. This does not mean, however, that the project of developing a monist
account of explanation has to be jettisoned altogether. Let me conclude with some
brief remarks on what an alternative version of explanatory monism might look
like.
Abstracting a bit from Reutlinger’s formulations, we can view his theory as a
version of the backing model of explanation that has been influentially proposed
by Kim (1988, 1994) and Ruben (2012). According to this model, all explanations
work because they provide information about objective relations of determination
or dependence such as causation or grounding. The backing model of explanation
is commonly considered a monist theory of explanation: all explanations instan-
tiate a common template, even though they can differ with respect to the kind of
relation that backs them. Reutlinger’s version of the counterfactual theory can be
viewed as an attempt to give some more substance to this idea by identifying fea-
tures that explanation-backing relations have in common, namely (a) giving rise
to a certain form of counterfactual dependence, and (b) being governed by non-
accidental generalizations.37 We have seen that (a) is no plausible candidate for a
distinctive feature of explanation-backing relations. (It might be a good candidate
for a feature that distinguishes causation from other explanation-backing relations.)
Feature (b), on the other hand, looks more promising. After all, relations that are
governed by non-accidental generalizations do not obtain between any two contin-
gent facts. Being connected by such relations thus seems a promising candidate
for a unifying feature of explanation-backing relations. Indeed, it has been argued
37 Schaffer sometimes comes close to endorsing a similar position, see (Schaffer, 2016: 89-90) and
(Schaffer, 2017: §§2.1-2.2).
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recently that grounding is law-governed in precisely the same sense in which cau-
sation is.38 That being said, being governed by non-accidental generalizations is
by itself not sufficient for being an explanation-backing relation. Relations such
as identity, necessitation, or supervenience are governed by non-accidental gener-
alizations but are generally considered unable to back explanations. Explanation-
backing relations pose more demanding constraints. Plausible further requirements
are being directed in some way (i.e. being non-symmetric) and having a certain
modal force.39 Causation and grounding both have these traits. So, a promising
idea would be to develop a monist account of explanation based on the idea that
explanations provide information about, modally robust, law-governed relations of
directed dependence. To develop such an account, however, is work for another
occasion.
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